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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.

vs.
.JUE WHEELER, DAVID BOYD
a11J .JOE .JACKSON,
Defendants-Respondents.

11855

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Salt Lake City has filed this appeal seeking to have
this court uphold the constitutional validity of its ordinance allowing warrantless inspection of licensed
l1rer taverns.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
AND PREFACE

This matter was previously heard by the Honortble D. Frank YVilkins of the Third Judicial District
l

I

Court in and for Salt Lake County. The Salt LaKt I
City Prosecutor and defendants' attorney orally agreel.
to have the cases of the three defendants-responclenti
consolidated for hearing before the said court to deter.
mine the constitutionality of a Salt Lake City tarern.
inspection ordinance, which ordinance underpinned all
of their convictions in the Salt Lake City Court. Although the record is sketchy, apparently the City Prose·
cutor did not wish to hold the two defendants-respon·
dents on their charge of interfering with an officer, ;11
the discharge of his official duties, if the court held thr
ordinance under which the police were acting unconstitutional. Therefore, counsel stipulated orally to tht
facts and submitted all three cases to the District Coun I
based on the constitutionality of Section 19-4-6, Revisea

Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah

(1965).

The District Court held the Salt Lake City ordi·
nance unconstitutionally vague, broad and violatire of
the defendants-respondents' right of privacy.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant submits that the decision of the
lower court should be reversed and that the ordinauce
should be declared constitutional in all regards.
FACTS
The defendants, David Boyd and Joe Jack.soln,
e ed rJO n
were arrested December 29, 1968, for an ali g
2

tioll of Section 3:l-l-5, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, [Ttah ( 1965); i.e., interfering with a police officer

\\'hile in the performance of his lawful duties on December
1968. On this date at approximately 2 :15 a.m.,
the Sall Lake City police officer entered the Regal
Lounge for the purpose of making an inspection of
premises licensed as a Class "C" beer parlor. The defendants dashed a suspected glass of liquor from the
11 ffieer's hands and were subsequently arrested, tried in
\he Salt Lake City Court and found guilty by Judge
}Ielrin Morris on May 15, 1969.
The defendant, Joe Wheeler, was arrested for a
riolation of Section 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, Utah ( 1965), for his actions on February
Zi. 1969, at approximately 8 :30 p.m. On this date he
refused to allow Salt Lake City police officers to make
an inspedion of the Regal Lounge, for which offense
he was tried April 24, 1969, and found guilty May 8,
l01i9, by City Judge Melvin Morris.
The three defendants consolidated an appeal to
the Third District Court, stipulated to the general facts
:11JJ submitted the case to Judge D. Frank \Vilkins on
the constitutionality of Salt Lake City's inspection orainanre, Section 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, Utah (1965) T-2. Judge Wilkins ruled the
ordinance unconstitutional by finding that it is vague,
urerbroad and allows searches without a showing of
probable cause and without a search warrant in viola111111 nf the Fourth Amendment.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE QUESTIONED
IS
DEFINITE AND CLEARLY ,,VORDED TO
GIVE NOTICE TO A PERSON OF ORDINAR\· I
INTELLIGENCE OF '¥HAT CONDUCT
REQUIRED OR PROSCRIBED; THERE.!
FORE, IT DOES NOT VIOLATE CONSTITr.
TION AL STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW FOR AMBIGUITY, VAGUENESS
OR BROADNESS.
The test for vagueness and ambiguity is clearh
set forth by many court decisions; a recent expression
of the law has been made as follows:

"A statute is void for vagueness whet1 it for·
bids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that man of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as lo
its application." Rollings v Shannan,
F.Supp. 850, 589 ( 1968), quoting Zu:ecklen
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967).
The Salt Lake City ordinance in question reads as
follows:
"The police department shall be permitted. tii
have access to all premises licensed or applymg
for license under this chapter, and shall make
. d"zc inspec
.
t'ions of sat'd pr em••·e•· 'and ,,reporl
perto
Sel'·
its findings to the board of comm1ssioners. Lakt
tion 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt
CitJJ, Utah ( 1965) . (Emphasis added.)
4

[( would be difficult to draft an ordinance which made
more clear the expected conduct. Clearly, under the
ordinance, the police are to be given access to the
licensed premises for the purpose of an inspection.
Tile word "premises" is of clear and definite meaniiig to any intelligent persons, especially as limited by
the word "licensed.'' These terms are further limited
111 their scope by definition to include only those areas
llf the building described in the license application. See
Sectiuu IU-1-.J., Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
['tah (1965); cf. Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Ann.
(19.JilJ and Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953),

amended. Therefore, the "licensed premises" is only
:1s broad as the licensee made it and is clearly not ambiguous or indefinite.
uo

The only other word which can raise any question
of ambiguity or vagueness is "inspection." It is ludir:rous to assert that the type of inspection the police
tould make must be defined in order that the tavern
11 wner should know what conduct is required of him
1111der the section. The word "inspection" has definite
meaning and informs the party that he must allow the
police iu to "see or to view." See, 21 A. TV ords
Pl1rr1scs, Hi2. Since the inspection is limited to the
licensed premises," it is difficult to see how a more
dear expression could be made, short of a check list
rrf inspection written for each licensed premises. This
JlPrsonified legislation cannot be demanded of a legislatiYe body.

5

The defendants have also maintained that th
e or·
.
. d f .
d mance
Is e ective for overbreadth in that the t'une ol.
.
mspection has not been outlined. It is important tii
note that Salt Lake City has the absolute right ancl
power to:
" ... license, tax, regulate or prohibit the sal
· 37 -7 -9, Utah Codee
o f. l'1gh t beer . . ." •S ecbon
Ann. (1953), as amended.

I

I
I
'I

These taverns are required to close by I :00 a.m.
except during daylight savings time, at which time titer
may remain open until 2 :00 a.m. Section 19-3-U, Rr-

vised Ordinance of Salt Lake City, Utah (1965).

infractions of the State and City laws occur after those
hours; to limit the right of inspection to only busines.1 ,
hours would make the City's right and power of regula- 1
tion largely illusory. The city has merely chosen
to exercise its power of regulation by requiring the
right to inspect, as a condition precedent to obtaining
a license, rather than absolutely prohibiting the sale
of beer. This is certainly within its discretion ana
clearly not an overly broad exercise of its power
Further, it is an exercise of a right to which the licensee
has impliedly consented by seeking a license.
Other states have similar inspection requiremenb
and an ordinance similar to our own, but one whicn
specifically allowed inspections at any hour, has been
successfully employed by our Sister State, New Jersey
State v Zurawski, 88 N.J.Super.488, 215 A.2. d 561
(1965). Further, the writer has been unable to
. h as mva
. I'd
. d a s1m1
. ·1ar ordinance tor
any case w h 1ch
1 ate

6
i
I

I

I
_j

uverbrcadth. If the City has the right of warrantless
inspection under the State statutes, that right cannot
be limited simply to business hours.

However, if this court felt that the inspection should
be limited to business hours, which is in effect how it
I has been employed, it should read "at reasonable times"
· I 111 to the ordinance. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
allowed state courts to judicially interpret ordinances to
keep them within constitutional bounds. See Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942). To
so interpret the ordinance would fulfill this court's duty
to use every reasonable presumption to uphold the constitutionality of a validly passed piece of legislation.

1
1

One could point out improvements which could be
ma<le in most any legislative enactment, but such possible improvements do not make the legislation invalid.
Legislation is presumed constitutional and every reasonable presumption should be employed to sustain its
only upon a showing by clear and convincing
eridenee is a statute to be ruled unconstitutional. 2
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §4106 (3rd Ed.
Gord v Salt Lake Cit,y, 20 Ut.2d 138, 434 P.2d
1 HU ( l!J67). This expression of statutory construction is
/ further augmented by the State expression concerning
the interpretation of criminal statutes in Section 76-1-2,
1
1\ah Code Ann. ( 1953) , to-wit:
I

1

i

"The rule of common law that penal statutes
are to he construed strictly has no application
to these revised statutes. The provisions of these
statutes are to be construed according to the fair
7

imr:ort of their terrns with a view to effect I/ii
obJect of the stat.utes and to promote ·11 .1...
'1 .S Ht ·
. a dd e d)
(E mp h as1s
.
Therefore, the court should find that the urdinanct
is not defectively vague, indefinite or over broad. It i\
well within the understanding of an average intellirrent
b
person and within the scope of statutory authority grant.
ed to Salt Lake City.
POINT II
THE ORDINANCE REQUIRING WARRANTLESS INSPECTIONS OF LICENSED
PUBLIC :BEER TAVERNS ON PAIX OF LJ.
CENSE REVOCATION IS A PROPER AXD
CONSTITUTION AL EXERCISE OF CITY
CONTROL.
The germane issue of the case before the bar 1,
whether or not a city may constitutionally require a beer
licensee to permit police inspection of his licensed prr
mises without a search warrant. The lower court fr
panded and extrapolated the holding of two Supreme
Court cases and ruled the ordinance unconstitutional
the cases are: See v Seattle, 387 U.S. 541. 18 L.eiUI
'·13·JS'
!) . i,a, and Municipal Court v Carnara, 387 US
. · .J.·
L.ed. 2d 930, 87 S.Ct. 1727 ( 1967). These cases art
markedlv distinITuishable from the case before the
and not.
tive of the germane issue.
fail
was clearlv explained in the 196H Second Circuit c<iir
Colonnad; Catering Corp. v. U. S., 410 F.2d J9i.

8

Here the Federal Government demanded the right
lo inspect liquor bottles believed to be refilled and resealed in violation of 18 U.S.C. §3731. The proprietor
of a ballroom allowed free inspection of the dance hall
area but refused the inspectors admittance to a locked
closet stating that he had no key and demanding that
the inspectors obtain a search warrant. The inspectors
refused to obtain a warrant, and, under authority of 26
['.S.C. 5H6b and 7606a, broke down the closet door.
The Circuit Court noted that these federal laws
allowed warrantless searches in liquor inspection cases
and distinguished the See and Camara cases on the exteptious noted in them by Justice White. The court
further held the defendants gave their implied consent
to allow inspection without a warrant. In so ruling, it
rerersed the lower court's supression of evidence and
remanded the case to trial.
Significant to the Second Circuit in the Colonnade
ease, supra, and language which exempts the dicta and
holding of See and Camara from being determinatfre
in the ease before the bar, is the following exception to
11arrant procedure noted by Justice lVhite:
"\Ve therefore conclude that administrative
entry, without consent, 1tpon portions of commercial premises which are not. open to the public may only be compelled ... within the framework of a warrant procedure. We do not in any
way imply that the business premises may not
reasonably be inspected in many more situations
than private homes, nor do we question such

9

accepted reyulatury techniques w; licens1·11 .
!J }JI 'J·
./
. .
.
yrmns w Inc 1 require inspection prior to aper 1...
1.
•
"
Ii Ill'/
.
buszne:Ys or mar11·ettng :'product. See t Seatt/.;
387 U.S. at p. 545, 54<6; 18 L.ed.2d 94i IE 1
phasis added.); cited in Colonnade Cater· u·
T S
.
'
/l/11
C urp. v. ( ) . ., 410 I< .2d at p. 200.
·
Here the Supreme Court exempts commercial pre·
mises open to the public from its holding and, aJ,11
licensing programs which require inspection prior 1i
operating a business. The City ordinance in quesb11 11
fits into both of these express exceptions. First. the
licensed premises subject of this appeal is quasi publ1r
in character, in that its patrons are invitees from tl1t
public at large. Secondly, the ordinance is a regulutun
one where violations are reported to the Board of Cil)
Commissioners for the purpose of license revocatio11.
Section 19-4-7, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake Gil!/·
Utah (1965). Thirdly, the ordinance in question al·
lows
as a
precedent.
for the opera hon of the busmess or marketmg the pro
duct. Section 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lakt

1

I
1

1

I
I

1

I
I.

,I

City, Utah (1965).

Cities and states have long employed this type 01 ·
an inspection requirement as a legitimate method or
control over businesses involved in the distribution of in·
· · seem to agTee that. i
toxicating beverages. All author1hes
.
·
b · ess 1n
the distribution of alcoholic beverages 1s a usm
b th New JPr1r1
need of special control. As state d Y e 1
· ··1tl •
Court in State v Zurawski, 88 N .J. Super. 488, 2la A. I
1

566 ( 1965) :

10

"From the earliest history of our State, the
s11le of intoxicating liquor has been dealt with
by the Legislature in an exceptional way. Because of its sui generis nature and significance,
it is a subject by itself, to the treatment of which
all the analogies of the law, appropriate to other
administrative agencies cannot be indiscriminately applied."
This New Jersey Court further observed that the
sale of intoxicating liquor is not a privilege guaranteed
by any constitutional provision, but one subject to complete prohibition and/ or regulation. See, Crawley v
Chrisfonsen, 137 U.S. 86, 11 S.Ct. 113, 34 L.ed. 620
, (1890). Therefore, it denied a motion to quash evidence
seized under a law almost identical to the one under
attack before this court. It said, "To do otherwise
would thwart the legislative policy for strict control of
a business said to be 'so prone to evils.'" Other courts
hare almost unanimously upheld similar ordinances and
declined to suppress evidence seized under them. See,
Oh-lahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v McCulley, 377 P.2d 568, 570 (Okl. 1962) rehearing denied;
Yuynto11 v State, 64 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1953); Gilber v
Bloodgood, 188 N.,V. 84 ('Vis. 1922); Wibmer v State,
195N.W. 936 (Wis. 1923); Solomon v Liquor Control
Commfasion, 212 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio 1965), rehearing
aenied; Fi<?cher v State, 74 A.2d 34 (Maryland 1950);
Hur/en 11 Depm·tment of Liquor Control, 136 N.E.2d
736, (Ohio 1955) .

It is respectfully submitted the U. S. Supreme
Court had these situations in mind, as well as others
11

noted in the Colonnade case, when it stated 1'ts ca1eat
.
concerning warrantless searches of public lJlace· ·
s il!il[ I
those incident to license control. Supra at p. 8.
!

I

The rationale employed by the Supreme Couri '.
in See and Camara was that of protecting those
areas of privacy where the party against whom tnt i
search was directed would not likely know the Jimiti '
of the inspection power or the scope of permitted searc11
However, the U. S. Supreme Court stated it did nut.
wish to require warrant procedure where to do so woula i
frustrate a legitimate government interest. Municipal I
Court v Camara, 387 U.S. at 533, 18 L.ed.zd at 938.

In Colonnade, the Circuit Court agreed with tne
underlying rationale of the Supreme Court and hel1l
that the refilled and resealed bottles would hare bm
removed; to require a warrant would have been disas·
trous to the government interest of protecting gorern
mental revenue. Also important to the Circuit Court
was the fact that the right of search and its scope \\3
restricted by statute; thus, individual rights were pro·
tected. It was further noted that the liquor industf) j,
a heavily regulated business and the court took judicial
knowledge that, as such, the individuals charged knell
the regulations affecting them and the scope of the inspectors' limited power; therefore, the warrantless search
was reasonable and, further, since the proprietors chose ·
to operate knowing of the government's inspection prnt·
1
lege, they were deemed to have impliedly conseuterl "
the warrantless search. The court said,
1

I

12

i

''The situation is substantially the same as if
the dealer had knowingly entered into a contract
waiving his right to privacy in those areas where
he keeps and sells alcoholic beverages. Such a
waiver with respect to subject matter in which
the public has a special interest would be enforceable." Colonnade Catering Corp. v U. S., 410
F.2d at p. 203.
For these reasons, the Second Circuit rightly distin-

guished See and Camara and upheld the warrantless
search.

In the case before the bar, the above arguments are

even more persuasive in favor of the City ordinance.
Here the inspection is:
(a) Limited by ordinance to the "licensed premises"; i.e., that area described to the City in the licensee's application. Section 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lah:e City, Utah ( 1965) .
(b) The area to be inspected is quasi public in that

patrons for the tavern are openly solicited from the

general public.

(c) The licensee applied for a license knowing of
:he City ordinance requiring inspections of the premises.
(d) The licensee is in the business of dispensing
alcoholic beveraegs, a business subject to strict legislative control because it is "so prone to evils." State v
Zurawski, 88 N.J. Super. 488, 215 A.2d 564 (1965).

(e) The governmental purpose of control and
regulating the licensee would be completely frustrated
13

by requiring a warrant before inspection· th 1·8 ·,
.
.
•
ts espe.
cially true smce a demand for inspection must ordinaril,
be made before a warrant may issue ' 1.,"un".''
I
:r1
/(/jli/I
Court v Camara, 387 U.S. at p. 539, 540; 18
i
I

941.

I
I

( f) The ordinance is not one of criminal searcn.
but regulatory in nature with the sanctions of limit
reyocation for infractions. Section 19-4-7, Revised Or.'
dinances of Salt Lah:e City, Utah (1965).

j
1

(g) This case is not a search of a private residence.
U. S. ·v Frisch, 140 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1944).
( h) It is not a case to suppress evidence stemming
from a search of private pockets or personal clothing.
Pinn Liquor Shop, Inc., v State Liquor Authoril11,
N.Y.2d 643, 249 N.E.2d 40 ( 1969).

There are many areas where warrantless search i1
not questioned. cf.: Border searches of one's baggage
on entry into the U. S., 19 U.S.C. §1467, 1496, l.58i; i
coal mine inspections, 30 U.S.C. §451-454; airport
buildings, land and equipment inspections by C.A.B,
49 U.S.C. §1377; See also other examples noted in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v U. S., -HO F.2d at P· ZOl
The ordinance in dispute fits iuto the reasoning arnl
purpose which allows warrantless inspections in these
areas. This court should follow the well-reasoned opinion
of the Second Circuit Court of Appea ls, dis. t'mgu ish
· thr
. t en ded br. Justice ,
See and Camara case, as express I y m

14

\\'hite, and find the ordinance a valid exercise of the
City police power of regulation over taverns.
CONCLUSION

1

Utah municipal corporations have the absolute right
to either prohibit the sale of beer or control, license and
regulate the businesses that sell it. Since the sale of beer
is a privilege, the City may require, as a condition precedent to obtaining a license, the right to inspect the licensed premises, Further, it has part of its regulatory
and police power the right to inspect the premises to find
riolations which may be grounds for license revocation.
Salt Lake City has drafted such an ordinance,
1rhich demands that licensed beer parlors allow warrantless inspections, in harmony with the statutory authority
delegated by the State to it. The ordinance is clear to
any reasonably intelligent person and requires the licensee to allow the police to inspect the licensed premises.
It is clear and unambiguous in intent, meaning and
scope; it is clearly not constitutionally vague, indefinite
or overly broad.
This ordinance requires licensess to allow inspection of only "public" beer parlors; that is, those who
openly solicit patrons from the general public for the
purpose of selling alcoholic beverages. Traditionally
there has been no question concerning this type of ordinance's validity in so far as the right of privacy and
search and seizure warrants are concerned. Recent

15

Supreme Court decisions acknowledge this area as an
exception to its expanded concept of warrant procedure
and since it would frustrate a legitimate governmental
interest to require a search warrant, the warrantless
inspection is constitutional. Further, the tavern, tne
licensees, consented to the warrantless inspection or
seeking a license; thus, the ordinance and the
under it are valid.
Dated this 24th day of December, 1969.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK L. CRELLIN
Salt Lake City Attorney

ROGER F. CUTLER
Assistant City Attorney
101 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll

Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Appellant
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